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Can decentralization strengthen democracy, or is it doomed to 
weaken the state?1 Since the 1970s, decentralization has been wide-
ly advocated as a means of strengthening democracy in developing 
countries. Scholars and policy advisors have promoted decentraliza-
tion as a way of ensuring political pluralism and enhanced account-
ability in service provision. Over the past three decades, most of the 
world’s countries have experimented with some form of decentral-
ization.
Yet many analysts worry that decentralization could weaken the 
state. Strong states are typically characterized as capable of establishing 
authority over their territory and population. This implies maintaining 
national unity, enjoying legitimacy while preventing internal conflict 
or secession, and providing public services and responding to citizens’ 
needs. Strong states were traditionally understood as unitary rather than 
federal, with power concentrated in the executive branch. Centralized 
states were generally considered superior in exerting authority over their 
territories and populations, formulating policy independently, ensuring 
conformity with legal mandates, and concentrating power at the top of 
the chain of command.
The appeal of the “strong state as centralized state” idea faded during 
the 1990s, as decentralization reforms cascaded throughout the world. 
While centralized states are strong in some respects, they can be “brit-
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tle” in others. They may feed tensions among fractious groups, leading 
to violence. They may be unresponsive, inefficient, or wasteful in the 
use of public resources. And they may facilitate a tyranny of the major-
ity or elite state capture on a national scale.
A surge of new evidence from di-
verse countries provides a basis for 
settling some of these disagreements, 
and also for correcting some of the 
fundamental misunderstandings of 
how decentralization affects democ-
racy and state strength. Here, we 
use such evidence to reconceptual-
ize some of the key tradeoffs affect-
ing decentralization, democracy, and 
state strength, and then offer practical 
guidance to assist policy makers and 
scholars in navigating the promises 
and pitfalls of reform. In order to determine how decentralization may 
weaken or strengthen the state, we focus on five key questions: Does 
decentralization 1) encourage secession or help to hold diverse popu-
lations together; 2) exacerbate or mitigate internal conflict; 3) weaken 
or strengthen the state’s ability to formulate policy autonomously and 
compel compliance with the law; 4) improve public-service delivery; 
and 5) encourage social learning?
Most of the answers are contingent. We argue that decentralization—
if properly designed—can deepen democracy without compromising 
state strength. Well-designed decentralization can foster higher levels 
of participation and legitimacy, which lower the costs of maintaining 
order, compel respect for the law, and reduce the need to project pow-
er. The ability to mobilize resources and provide services in a context 
of low opposition and modest transaction costs will bolster the legiti-
macy of the democratic practices that underpin these results. Lastly, 
decentralization can increase social learning, producing a dynamic that 
strengthens the state from the grassroots upward.
Just as the flexibility of an aircraft’s wings increases its resilience 
through their capacity to dissipate shocks, decentralizing a state may 
increase its democratic strength by making it more “supple.” By increas-
ing the density of government structure in terms of elected local and 
regional representation, decentralization can generate more feedback 
loops and increase the overall level of accountability to which govern-
ment is subject. This serves to increase both the state’s sensitivity to 
local complaints and conditions and its options for response via overlap-
ping responsibility and multiple redundancies in the policy realm. Sim-
ply put, in a centralized system citizens have one authority to appeal to. 
In a decentralized system, they have several, each with its own powers 
Just as the flexibility of an 
aircraft’s wings increases 
its resilience through their 
capacity to dissipate 
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and independent incentives to listen. All else being equal, citizens are 
more likely to get satisfaction for at least some of their concerns in a de-
centralized system. Additionally, by bringing government “closer to the 
people,” decentralization may increase participation in state-building 
processes from the ground up.
Maintaining National Unity
A key component of state strength is the ability to exert authority 
over a territory and its population. Many developing states were born 
out of international agreements, often with arbitrarily defined borders 
based on colonial partition and with little to hold them together beyond 
guarantees by the international community. They exist de jure, but un-
like European states, in which power over a territory and its population 
generally came first and sovereignty and international recognition fol-
lowed, the states in many developing countries have yet to achieve the 
internal consent or territorial reach necessary to exert authority over 
their entire dominion.2 
Many developing countries are made up of different ethnic groups, 
sometimes spread over vast geographic areas, each with its own cus-
toms, language, and culture. A national consciousness is often lacking. 
Citizens do not feel represented by the government, and perceive that 
leaders cater mainly to people of their own tribe or region, rather than 
to all citizens equally. In addition, parallel or rival forms of authority, 
such as traditional chiefs, religious leaders, or even drug lords, may 
supersede the authority of the state. As a result, many states suffer from 
disunity within, sometimes resulting in violent conflict or secession. 
How does decentralization affect national unity? By dispersing pow-
er from the center to many subnational units, decentralization could 
reinforce local cultural or ethnic identities, thereby deepening divides 
between groups and undermining efforts to build a single national iden-
tity. Decentralization might also give subnational leaders the necessary 
resources and “institutional weapons” to mobilize the local population 
and demand more political power from the center, raising the prospect 
of secession. Beyond using such resources to fund political parties and 
campaigns, these leaders could support armed insurgencies and invest 
in the sorts of violence against civilians that peace talks cannot later 
reconcile. The recent history of the Balkans richly and sadly illustrates 
this dynamic.
Decentralization might also lead restive groups to demand more 
autonomy. With more power and independence, and with subnational 
leaders more experienced in governing, decentralized areas could de-
cide that they can manage their affairs better on their own. For these 
reasons, former British prime minister John Major of the Conservative 
Party refused to devolve powers to Scotland, claiming that devolution 
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was a “Trojan horse to independence.”3 The Labour government that 
succeeded him did devolve powers, and a referendum for full Scottish 
independence indeed followed (though it failed). In a number of other 
countries, regions have seceded after first setting up decentralized insti-
tutions. South Sudan is one recent example.
Other arguments, however, assert that by bringing government 
“closer to the people,” decentralization will strengthen state authority. 
When small subnational governments with decision-making powers ex-
ist throughout a country, citizens can more easily raise concerns with 
public officials. Those officials, in turn, will be more likely to work with 
the people. Thus decentralization could give the state greater presence 
and reach, thereby ensuring that the interests of citizens in every corner 
of the country are reflected in policy and public services.
Similarly, bringing locally elected subnational leaders from different 
segments of the country into government may make formerly excluded 
parts of the population feel better represented. Where divisions are de-
fined territorially, decentralization is said to promote the formation of 
multiple but complementary identities, meaning that citizens can simul-
taneously identify both with an ethnic group and with the polity as a 
whole. By giving territorially concentrated groups the power to make 
their own decisions about the issues that most interest them, decentral-
ization can accommodate diversity and protect groups against abuse or 
neglect from the center or from one another. In other words, decentral-
ization can act as a pressure valve for nationalist aspirations. In Canada 
and Spain, for example, decentralization has been deemed a success in 
keeping the fractious provinces of Quebec and Catalonia, respectively, 
from seceding. In the United Kingdom, the devolution of regional pow-
ers to the Northern Ireland Assembly was the critical element that made 
possible successful peace talks with the Irish Republican Army.
Can decentralization be designed in a way that holds fractious groups 
together rather than promoting secession? Yes—by decentralizing pow-
er and authority to a level below that of major ethnic, linguistic, or other 
identity groups. In this way, empowered subnational units will avoid 
being associated with group identity or privilege and will not stoke di-
visive tensions. In a country where an ethnic minority is concentrated 
in one region, decentralizing to the regional level is far more likely to 
reinforce ethnic divisions and place authority and resources in the hands 
of those with the most to gain from national breakup. Decentralizing to 
the local level, however, will create many units of any given ethnicity, 
and most likely some that are mixed. As a result, government will not 
be associated with any particular ethnicity, nor with ethnicity per se; 
rather, service provision will be the main measure by which govern-
ment is judged. Nigeria offers a good example of the benefits of drawing 
boundaries in this way.
Complementary reforms that promote a single internal market for 
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goods and services nationwide can also help by preventing the rise of 
elites with region-specific economic interests who might gain from a na-
tional schism. Elites whose economic interests are multiregional instead 
would have a strong interest in national integrity and growth, even if 
their assets or historical bases are in a particular region. Specific mea-
sures such as improved infrastructure and transport links, which also 
facilitate the flow of people and ideas across an economy, can help to 
bring a multiregional outlook.
Mitigating Internal Conflict
By empowering a new set of players, decentralization tends to shift 
the intrastate balance of power. This can be dangerous. Power shifts 
and disruptions in political settlements can cause conflict, which in turn 
can be stoked in order to further shift the balance of power. Yet power 
shifts can also be used to end conflict. Where conflict already exists, 
decentralization can be designed in ways that either mitigate or inflame 
violence. The difference depends on the specific country’s balance of 
power and on the political bargains and settlements of the players in-
volved.
Decentralized governments that are responsive to national minori-
ties will defuse tension within the polity. But local governments that 
become “little tyrannies,” ignoring or oppressing local minorities, will 
ignite tensions. In some cases, decentralization has produced local lead-
ers who discriminate against minorities in their regions. For instance, in 
1999 parts of northern Nigeria began adopting their own (shari‘a) law. 
When the Christian minority has been forced to comply, tensions have 
risen between the Christian and Muslim communities.4
To prevent potential conflicts, decentralization should be designed 
with strong local-accountability mechanisms that align local leaders’ 
incentives with the will of local citizens and allow voters to hold poli-
ticians responsible for their decisions. Additionally, the central gov-
ernment should enact strong national safeguards of minority rights, to 
which individuals and groups in any locality can appeal.
Decentralization can play a major role in power-sharing arrange-
ments that settle power struggles between different groups in society. 
By creating new forums for political competition, and hence new prizes 
over which opposing parties can compete, decentralization solves the 
winner-takes-all problem inherent in centralization, where parties in 
government wield vast resources and reap huge rewards while opposi-
tion parties are left to wither. In a federal system, opposition parties 
can win power over states and local governments, giving such parties a 
voice in national debates and opportunities to show their competence.5 
Moreover, the penalty of losing national elections is not as steep, which 
reduces the temptation to win at any cost. This dynamic can starve vio-
65Jean-Paul Faguet, Ashley M. Fox, and Caroline Pöschl
lence of the oxygen that feeds it and help to cement the peace in post-
conflict environments.
For exactly this reason, decentralization was advocated in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but the results so far are unconvincing. In Ethiopia, by 
contrast, reform has produced material, though not democratic, prog-
ress. Decentralization was a key component of the settlement that ended 
the country’s seventeen-year civil war in 1991: A victorious coalition 
of regional militias agreed to divide the country into eleven federal re-
gions, each dominated by a party linked to one of the militias. Although 
this divided the political opposition and helped the ruling party to main-
tain its grip on power, it also secured the peace and paved the way for 
an economic recovery that eventually made Ethiopia the fastest-growing 
economy in Africa.6 Regional and local governments became important 
conduits for investments in education, agriculture, and health. Thus de-
centralization in Ethiopia has been a doubled-edged sword—crucial for 
maintaining peace, but also a means for oligopolizing power and per-
petuating the rule of a dominant coalition.7
In some cases, decentralization might merely shift conflict downward 
rather than eliminating it altogether. Uganda’s government under Presi-
dent Yoweri Museveni implemented a decentralization program in 1986 
in order to reduce national-level conflict. While successful in this re-
gard, the ultimate effect was arguably to replace conflict at the top with 
conflict at the local level.8
How can decentralization be designed in ways that promote power-
sharing? A properly operating decentralized system should naturally 
lead to the sharing of powers that have been devolved to different subna-
tional levels of government. Few additional reforms are required beyond 
the avoidance of electoral and fiscal distortions. Electoral-finance laws 
that promote a level political playing field are particularly important in 
this regard, as one of the most powerful and prevalent ways in which 
democracy is distorted is through the flow of money into campaigns. 
Where political competition is open to new entrants and the playing 
field is level, elections will usually be fought over issues of substance to 
local voters, and political conflict and violence will be transformed into 
electoral contestation.
Making and Enforcing the Law
A strong state should be able to formulate policy goals autonomously 
and compel compliance with its policies and law without succumbing to 
pressures from particular groups or competing authority structures. This 
implies independence from powerful interests not just of politicians, but 
also of the bureaucracy that implements policy decisions. The latter is 
typically achieved by putting in place an organized, professional cadre 
of civil servants who can maintain policy continuity and make decisions 
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for the general interest of society rather than for the benefit of specific 
groups or individuals. States possessing such characteristics are likely 
to retain broad legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.
By contrast, the inability to imple-
ment goals, to police effectively, or to 
prevent the subversion of policy ob-
jectives by government agents is in-
dicative of a weak state. States with 
such characteristics often feature per-
sonalized rule and systemic privati-
zation of public assets and benefits. 
States are also considered weak if 
their political institutions—in partic-
ular, their constitutions and electoral 
rules—are often altered or ignored. 
When the “rules of the game” keep 
changing, it undermines confidence in 
the state, which in turn undermines the state’s ability to generate shared 
behavioral expectations that shape and strengthen political structures.
Does decentralization improve a state’s ability to make and imple-
ment autonomous decisions? At first blush, the answer would seem to be 
no. Decentralized countries tend to involve more players, some of whom 
may have veto powers over policy decisions. In centralized countries, 
the command structure is cleaner and simpler, and decisions can be ex-
ecuted more easily and quickly. Decentralization can lead to a loss of 
control at the top, and an inability to act quickly or in concert. It might 
weaken coherence between local and national policies. For example, 
a central government that has granted spending powers to subnational 
governments may find it more difficult to exercise fiscal discipline. This 
can create serious macroeconomic problems, as it did in Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1990s. 
In policy debates on this issue, proponents of decentralization typi-
cally reply that having more players involved in the decision-making 
process is actually an asset that yields greater policy stability, thus mak-
ing the state stronger. Because dramatic policy switches would require 
coordination among more independent agents, they are harder to achieve 
and thus less likely. A deeper analysis tells us that decentralization 
should be viewed not as a simplistic choice between a “weak” devolved 
government and a “strong” centralized one, but rather as a move from a 
centralized command structure that is streamlined but brittle to one that 
is more complex but supple. 
Such a system has many actors with overlapping sources of author-
ity, and for it to operate well, coordination and cooperation are more 
important than command and control. The resulting suppleness means 
that failings on the part of the national government (due to corruption or 
When the “rules of the 
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ineptitude, for example) that would have serious local consequences in 
a centralized system can be attenuated or even undone by regional or lo-
cal authorities in a decentralized system, as recent evidence from India, 
Bolivia, and Colombia shows.9
A better way to frame the key tradeoff is as one between the strength 
of the leader and the strength of state institutions. Where the leader has 
vast discretion to make sweeping changes to public policy and organiza-
tions, that leader is stronger at the expense of the state. But where the 
leader’s discretion is circumscribed by rules, procedures, and the need 
to agree on decisions with other independent actors in order to proceed, 
the state is stronger and more stable at the expense of the leader. By 
increasing the number of independent actors and requiring a measure 
of consensus among them, decentralization weakens central leaders and 
creates or empowers subnational leaders. This dynamic increases the 
strength of the state by strengthening it institutionally.
At the same time, under decentralization the local political process 
might in some cases be more vulnerable to capture by local interest 
groups, resulting in a distortion of political representation. In other 
words, small local interest groups could gain decisive influence over 
local government, giving them disproportionate advantages. Local civil 
society and local governments will often be too weak to oppose local 
elites, and may even internalize elite priorities as their own. If decentral-
ization produces weak local governments that are cowed and captured 
by local elites, then policy autonomy is lost. In Indonesia, for instance, 
authoritarian local elites collude with political bosses to capture local 
governments and resources.10
While the local-capture argument has much merit, it underplays the 
comparative threat that elite capture poses at the national level, where 
the rewards are considerably larger. The richest interest groups invest 
enormous sums to capture national government. When successful, these 
groups gain powers and privileges far greater than anything available 
through local capture, with potentially deleterious effects for the entire 
nation. Elite capture is a real threat. But it is a threat for all kinds and lev-
els of government. Central policy making is not necessarily autonomous 
policy making. Combating elite capture both nationally and locally re-
quires effective accountability and transparency measures. But achieving 
transparent, accountable government is a difficult long-term project that 
requires sustained action and constant vigilance. The September 2014 
“disappearance” of 43 students in Guerrero, Mexico, by corrupt local of-
ficials in league with the police reminds us just how big that challenge is 
and how difficult implementing these ideas can be.
A centralized state’s efficiency in making policy does not necessarily 
translate into efficient policy implementation, particularly when poli-
cies designed centrally are ill-suited to local conditions. By contrast, a 
decentralized government grants opportunities for participation in poli-
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cy design to regions and local governments, enabling more precise and 
dynamic policy responses to diverse local conditions. Such policies tend 
to be regarded as more legitimate, and they are likely to gain greater 
compliance from civic actors. Decentralized decision making may be 
slower, but the resulting decisions are more likely to “stick.”
Finally, in many highly centralized states local-government struc-
tures are simply nonexistent. Exposure to vibrant new local govern-
ments can strengthen the state by expanding its presence and providing 
citizens with more direct interactions with government and elections, 
thereby improving the perception of state responsiveness and enhancing 
the legitimacy of national governments. For example, prior to decen-
tralization in 1994 most of the Bolivian countryside lacked any form 
of local administration that provided services or represented citizens. 
Following decentralization, elected local governments accountable to 
voters sprang up throughout the country. In countless interviews, when 
asked how decentralization had affected their lives, poor rural citizens 
said that they finally felt Bolivian, that decentralization had given citi-
zenship meaning, and that at last there was evidence that they mattered 
and the state cared for them.11 Thus in Bolivia the spread of local gov-
ernments and bureaucracies, and the services that they provide, have 
clearly strengthened the state in citizens’ eyes.
Accountable Public-Service Delivery
Another marker of a strong state is the ability to carry out smart poli-
cies that meet public needs. Providing basic services to the population is 
a primary function of the state. States that do this well will be regarded 
as more legitimate and authoritative, making them stronger. One of the 
most frequently cited and powerful arguments in favor of decentraliza-
tion is that it will improve government responsiveness to citizen de-
mands. By enabling government to tailor decisions to the specific needs 
of the local population, decentralization facilitates a more precise and 
cost-effective matching of resources to needs. Moreover, competition 
between subnational governments for residents and investment can 
serve as an incentive to improve services.
Under decentralized government, public services should also improve 
as a result of greater government accountability. Bringing decision-
making power closer to citizens and creating popularly elected positions 
at the local level transforms incentives for accountability: Rather than 
being accountable mainly to superiors in higher levels of government, 
local officials become accountable to their constituents, on whom they 
depend for votes and tax revenue. 
In addition, citizens can more easily monitor and make demands of 
a nearby local administration than the central government in a faraway 
capital. In both Bolivia and Colombia, for example, shifts in incentives 
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and accountability relations have altered investment decisions nation-
wide, resulting in significant improvements in basic service delivery.12 
In Ethiopia, too, decentralization in the 1990s devolved spending pow-
ers to the regions, allowing funds to reach many previously neglected 
local governments for the first time. The resulting shift in spending 
decisions markedly improved health and education indicators in these 
localities.13
A related argument is that decentralized structures can leverage lo-
cal social capital to improve government performance. A high density 
of civic organizations, which encourages people to work together and 
build trust, can foster behaviors conducive to better performance. Where 
social trust and civic organization are present, local government tends 
to respond to citizens’ needs more effectively and with less waste and 
corruption than it otherwise would. This appears to have been the case 
in northern and central Italy after decentralization in the early 1970s, as 
well as in many parts of Bolivia after 1994.14 Scholars are skeptical that 
this type of social capital can be developed under centralized govern-
ment.15
Not everyone agrees that decentralization will improve government 
performance. In addition to raising concerns about the loss of econo-
mies of scale and the possibility of elite capture, opponents of decen-
tralization argue that it will increase the discretion of local elites in 
the distribution of public goods, thereby strengthening patron-client 
relationships. Moreover, subnational governments may not have the 
technical or human capacity to provide the level of services that the 
central government can. Studies of federal systems have tended to find 
that central governments are more effective at making equitable al-
location decisions, especially for assisting the poor. This is important 
because politically induced interregional inequality can lead to con-
flict and weaken the state.
Another risk of decentralization is overspending by subnational gov-
ernments. Overspending can cause fiscal imbalances and macroeco-
nomic problems that threaten state strength and stability. Decentralizing 
taxation (in addition to spending), prohibiting bailouts, and setting hard 
budget constraints will help to mitigate these risks. Such measures are 
likely to increase incentives for local government to tailor policies and 
services to taxpayers’ priorities, and citizens will have a greater incen-
tive to monitor the use of funds. 
Fiscal problems are not a result of decentralization per se, but of bad-
ly designed decentralization. They can be remedied by altering rules and 
the subnational incentive structure. Likewise, decentralization that loses 
important economies of scale is a badly designed reform. Any ratio-
nal decentralized system will involve continuing coproduction of pub-
lic goods and services at the central, regional, and local levels. Goods 
with large economies of scale should be produced centrally, while those 
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that have significant heterogeneity or require local informational inputs 
should be produced locally.
Social Learning
Of all the ways in which decentralization affects state strength, social 
learning may be the most powerful, not least because it operates through 
each of the components discussed above, as well as in other ways. Be-
cause social learning happens over time, understanding it requires dy-
namic analysis rather than the kind of comparative static analysis that is 
used to study decentralization’s effects on policy or governance-related 
issues. Social learning can be thought of as a dynamic view of social 
capital. It hearkens back to Tocqueville’s exploration of the role of civil 
society in democracy and his celebration of America’s vibrant associa-
tional life.16 
Decentralized government accelerates social learning over time in a 
way that centralized government does not. Whereas regional and nation-
al governments operate through elected or delegated representatives, de-
centralized government operates at a community level that is susceptible 
to personal action and initiative. The small scale of local politics allows 
citizens to become political actors either individually or through civic 
organizations. Such organizations are often informal, with small or no 
budgets, and rely on volunteers to staff critical positions. They are ideal 
entry points for citizens to have their first encounter with politics, gain 
exposure to political debate and public decision making, and become 
politically engaged.
Social learning is learning by doing. As such, it relies on interac-
tions among citizens and between citizens and their government. In a 
decentralized system, ordinary people can have repeated interactions 
with local government on matters of public policy and resources, either 
directly or indirectly through civic organizations that debate positions 
and compete with firms, other interests, and one another to influence 
government. Such access would not be possible at the level of central 
government, given its high resource thresholds, professionalized organi-
zations, formal and intricate rules and norms, and obscure jargon.
To better understand social learning, it is helpful to consider some 
elemental, yet commonly overlooked, tasks that are crucial to democ-
racy. For a democracy to represent and then act on the will of its citi-
zens in a way that is fair and responsive, it must be able to 1) identify 
and articulate shared preferences and opinions; 2) aggregate shared 
preferences; and 3) enforce accountability. 
How does a new policy idea arise in society? Some, but not all, of a 
citizen’s many needs and preferences will overlap with those of other 
citizens. In order to be elected, a politician must identify those needs 
that are shared by the most voters, articulate them in ways that voters 
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find convincing, and then propose viable policy solutions. By show-
ing citizens that certain demands are shared, politicians convert private 
preferences into public ones, creating political voice where before there 
was none.
Once the public has been convinced that certain policy ideas are 
important, society must weigh competing demands (and the tradeoffs 
that they imply), and choose which options to pursue. This is where the 
political process and government come in, negotiating the needs and 
demands of different groups, firms, and organizations in the search for 
something like a social optimum. This occurs most obviously through 
elections, when individuals vote for competing candidates who offer 
different policy platforms, and the most preferred candidate wins. In 
a well-functioning democracy, policy decisions are arrived at in many 
other ways as well, continually and at all levels of society.
Once a polity has expressed its preferences, formed them into politi-
cal options, and chosen which of these it wishes to pursue collectively, it 
requires mechanisms for holding politicians to account. In a democracy, 
citizens must have levers of influence over elected officials to ensure 
that socially preferred bundles of policies are implemented with reason-
able efficiency. Absent accountability, all the preceding is for naught—
a mere illusion of democratic choice that confers little voice and no 
power to the people. Regular elections, through which citizens can vote 
out unsatisfactory officials, are the most obvious accountability mecha-
nism. But, again, there are others.
Why does decentralization matter? Because scale is determinant and 
its effects are nonlinear. The large scale of central government demands 
disproportionately greater resources and levels of organization for ef-
fective engagement than does local government. Hence, the autonomous 
organizations that populate the space between politicians and voters are 
open to citizen participation and agency at the local level, but closed to 
most citizens at the central level, confining them to the role of voters, 
onlookers, and perhaps dues-payers. 
In a decentralized government, by contrast, opportunities to partici-
pate in public decision making abound. Thus experience accrues and 
learning occurs among individual voters and their small-scale collec-
tives (civic groups, local lobbies). Participation in local government 
leads naturally to social learning around narrow questions of effective-
ness, but also higher-order learning about fellow citizens’ needs, re-
source constraints, and the efficacy of public versus private action for 
certain classes of problems. 
The experience of working together teaches people to work together 
better. This leads to a gradual convergence of individuals’ perspectives 
around local needs and standards of service delivery, generating greater 
political legitimacy. An inclination toward conflict and contestation can 
be transformed into regularized interaction and cooperation, helping to 
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build stores of trust that can be drawn on if conflict threatens in the fu-
ture. The workings of central government, by contrast, tend to reinforce 
the organizational, technical, and financial advantages of highly profes-
sionalized groups, thus deepening the chasm between policy making and 
the ordinary citizen.
Decentralization and local government can thus promote political 
legitimacy and long-term state-building from the grassroots up in a 
way that centralized government cannot. This is the deeper meaning 
of a state that is “democratically supple.” Beyond just having “more 
elected officials,” it means that democracy as a method of choosing 
leaders and arriving at collective decisions is deepened, substantively 
improved, and made more legitimate in the eyes of voters who engage 
in it directly at the local level.
Designing Reform
The dynamic described above should operate naturally in a truly de-
centralized system; little more is required in terms of complementary 
reforms or institutions than the absence of active distortions. Based on 
our analysis, we recommend that reformers decentralize to government 
units small enough for individuals and their voluntary organizations to 
actively participate in decision making and regularly affect outcomes. 
The resource and organizational thresholds required for effectiveness 
will vary by country and by level of development. But for a “typical” 
developing country, a local government in which citizen participation is 
viable might number in the tens of thousands of inhabitants. It should 
also be geographically compact enough that an ordinary citizen at one 
end of a local-government district has some direct knowledge of how an 
ordinary citizen at the other end lives.
The existence of small units with populations under a hundred-thou-
sand does not imply the abolition of larger units that provide services 
and mediate between citizens, localities, and the central government. It 
does imply, however, that the principle of decentralizing to small units 
should apply equally to the developing world’s megacities, with their 
ten-million-plus inhabitants, as well as to rural areas. In order to reap 
the full benefits of reform, suitable services such as trash collection, 
street lighting, and primary education should be further decentralized 
below city level—to boroughs, local councils, and the other submetro-
politan units that naturally occur in most countries. This has worked 
in La Paz and in London, for example. City and state governments can 
retain dominant roles in coordinating across the subunits, as well as in 
financing and managing more sophisticated services such as tertiary 
education, healthcare, urban transport, and most environmental protec-
tion. But residing in a megacity such as Mumbai rather than a village 
should not prohibit a citizen from meaningful political participation.
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While consensus on the advantages and disadvantages of decentral-
ized government remains elusive, we believe that the case in favor of 
decentralization is strong. Although it entails risks, the potential for 
decentralized government to bolster democracy is greater than these 
dangers. Real policy experiments in various countries over the past sev-
eral decades show that well-planned decentralizing reforms can have a 
positive impact on five key elements of state strength—national unity, 
conflict mitigation, policy autonomy, responsive service delivery, and 
social learning. 
A well-designed reform that decentralizes power and resources to a 
level below that of major social or regional cleavages is most likely to 
foster local governments concerned with efficiency and service provi-
sion rather than with social identity and grievance. Moreover, such a 
reform not only would strengthen government institutions at the expense 
of central leaders’ discretion; by putting in place a system in which there 
are many actors with overlapping authority, it would also prevent the 
capture of government by a small urban elite. Likewise, a well-designed 
reform—for example, one that decentralizes only activities with low 
economies of scale, devolves taxation, and bars bailouts and subnation-
al debt—should foster better public-service provision. Finally, social 
learning, which promotes political legitimacy, long-term state-building, 
and democratic suppleness, is likely to accelerate in a decentralized en-
vironment, where the small scale of politics allows citizens to partici-
pate either individually or through their civic organizations. 
The key takeaway from all this is that decentralization’s most power-
ful impact on state strength comes not through its direct effects on the 
structure of government, but rather through its effects on the democratic 
norms and practices that underpin the state. Even where decentraliza-
tion’s first-order effects on governance are indeterminate or negative, 
they are outweighed by its positive second-order effects on democratic 
participation, transparency, and legitimacy. The promise of decentral-
ization is not so much that it alters the state as that it deepens democ-
racy. And deeper democracy makes the state stronger and better.
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